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Abstract
Purpose – Chinese companies are increasingly using cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
to source knowledge or strategic assets. For many, global acquisitions have proven to be highly
problematic and value-destroying. The purpose of this paper is to address this critical acquisition
failure issue from an absorptive capacity perspective.
Design/methodology/approach – Guided by the framework that focuses on how acquiring a
firm’s weak absorptive capacity damages its ability to assimilate, integrate and apply external new
knowledge, one high-profile Chinese failed acquisition: TCL acquisition of France’s Thomson’s TV
business in 2004 is analyzed empirically.
Findings – Acquisition performance of Chinese overseas M&A is found to be substantially affected
by the acquiring firm’s absorptive capacity at multiple dimensions.
Research limitations/implications – The absorptive capacity construct provides an insightful
account for differentials in Chinese overseas M&A performance.
Practical implications – For decision makers interested in formulating and implementing overseas
M&A strategy, appropriate evaluation of their own firms’ absorptive capability should be the first
step to take.
Originality/value –This is the first paper to apply absorptive capacity arguments to Chinese
resource-driven M&A strategy, and will prompt business academicians and practitioners to think
about M&A strategy in new and innovative ways.
Keywords China, Acquisitions and mergers, Organizational development, Assets management
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) has become a dominant mode of entry for
Chinese firms’ outward foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2005 Chinese companies were
involved in 274 cross-border M&As valued at $5.3 billion (UNCTAD, 2006), while in 2006
the acquisition value jumped to $20.7 billion (Economist.com, 2007). In the first quarter of
2008, M&A volume from China reached $28.5 billion, four times the year-earlier value
(Xinhua, 2008). Although there are a variety of reasons, strategy asset seeking is an
important rationale for Chinese cross-border M&A, that is, utilizing foreign M&A as the
means to acquire strategy assets or knowledge so as to compensate their competitive
disadvantage (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2007). However, such resource-driven
M&A does not guarantee success particularly due to tacit and proprietary nature of
knowledge. For many Chinese companies, global acquisitions have proven to be highly
problematic and value-destroying (Economist.com, 2007).
In light of the growing importance and prevalence of China’s cross-border M&A
activities and a number of examples of acquisition failure, it is imperative for us to
consider the strategic and performance dimensions of such M&As (Fan et al., 1998). By
drawing on theories of absorptive capacity, we intend to uncover some of the key firm-
level factors and mechanisms that may cause foreign M&As to fail. Absorptive
capacity literature (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2006; Zahra and George,
2002) highlights the importance of taking in external knowledge, combining it with
internal knowledge and absorbing it for commercial use. Firms with lower absorptive
capacity would have a weaker foundation to create knowledge, assimilate and interpret
opportunities, and less effectively develop and apply explicit knowledge.
Building on the literature, we propose an absorptive capacity approach which
argues whether and to what extent that Chinese companies can effectively acquire
strategic assets and enhance their competitive advantage is determined by acquiring
firms’ absorptive capacity at multi-dimensional levels. Guided by this theoretical
framework, we empirically analyze one influential M&A deal conducted by a leading
Chinese company, TCL. For TCL, its 2004 acquisition of France’s Thomson’s TV
business has proven to be highly problematic and is regarded as a typical example of
Chinese company that ‘‘failed miserably in overseas expansion’’ (Economist.com, 2007).
As the first study that applies the arguments of absorptive capacity to resource-driven
M&As from Chinese firms, we aim to explain in detail why TCL’s M&A failed, thereby
prompting business academicians and practitioners to think about M&A strategy in
new and innovative ways.
Absorptive capacity perspective: foundation and key components
According to the knowledge-based view (Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992),
knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, is the most important strategic asset and
companies may use cross-border M&A to gain access to new knowledge and skills
controlled by indigenous firms (Nadolska and Barkema, 2007). Using M&A for
resolving knowledge deficiencies, however, does not necessarily result in superior
returns because strategic assets often are tacit, specific and complex (Amit and
Schoemaker, 1993). In addition, in the early stages of internationalization, firms tend to
underestimate the complexities of foreign acquisitions and exaggerate the synergies
from combination of the merging firms’ strategic assets (Child et al., 2001). To become
successful in overseas acquisitions, firms need to develop the knowledge and routines
so as to overcome these problems, that is, absorptive capacity (Zollo and Singh, 2004).
Absorptive capacity is widely defined as ‘‘the ability to recognize the value of new,
external information, assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends’’ (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990, p. 1). It derives from stocks of knowledge within the firm and is
a function of prior organizational problem solving (Kogut and Zander, 1992). The
absorptive capacity construct has emerged as an underlying theme in global strategy
management and has been used to explain diverse organizational phenomena such
as strategic alliances, organizational learning, knowledge acquisition and transfer, and
business performance (Lane et al., 2006). It is generally agreed that absorptive capacity
represents an organization’s dynamic capability and it is a multi-dimensional construct;
each dimension plays a different but complementary role in explaining how absorptive
capacity influences knowledge acquisition and business outcomes. For example, Zahra
and George (2002) conceptualize it as a dynamic capability with a multi-dimensional
construct involving a firm’s ability to acquire, assimilate, transform and exploit
knowledge. Moreover, absorptive capacity itself is determined by a number of
organizational antecedents which have differing influences on different components of
absorptive capacity (e.g. Jansen et al., 2005), thus helping us understand why certain
firms are able to acquire and assimilate new external knowledge, but not able to
transform and exploit it successfully. For instance, Kim (1998) has considered the level of
prior related knowledge as the determinant of absorptive capacity and van den Bosch
and his colleagues (1999) have demonstrated how organizational forms and combinative
capacities influence the level of absorptive capacity.
In this paper, we propose an absorptive capacity model that takes into account the
most important developments in the literature as well as the most relevant features
in the cross-border M&A context. This model consists of three key components that
shape absorptive capacity with each component determined by a number of
organizational factors, as summarized in Figure 1. In the first dimension, antecedents
of absorptive capacity such as prior knowledge are critical for the firm to recognize and
understand the strategic assets to be acquired. The second dimension involves using of
combinative capabilities to assimilate and combine newly acquired assets with the
firm’s existing resources. Finally, the last dimension focuses on how the acquiring
firms effectively transform and apply the acquired strategic assets. In the following, we
elaborate on each component by focusing on some of the key determinants, as shown in
bold in the figure.
Ability to understand strategic assets and its key determinant: prior related knowledge
Recognizing and identifying the value of new external knowledge is the first step
toward acquisition of strategic assets. Much of the literature has identified absorptive
capacity as a knowledge base and specifically as the extent of prior knowledge in the
firm (Kim, 1998; Lane et al., 2001). Specifically, ‘‘½. . .organization needs prior related
knowledge to assimilate and use new knowledge’’ (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, p. 129).
A firm’s prior knowledge contributes to its absorptive capacity as it helps the firm to
understand the industry, products and customers that are related to the knowledge
held by the foreign firm, thus facilitating knowledge absorption and development
(Kim, 1998). Firms with a high level of absorptive capacity are likely to harness new
knowledge from acquired firms to help their innovative activities; without such
capacity, it is hard for them to learn or transfer knowledge from one unit to another
(Szulanski, 1996). Managers can help develop their firms’ absorptive capacity by
building knowledge stocks through investment in internal R&D and carefully
examining the potential target firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lei and Hitt, 1995). For
emerging market firms, the intensity of effort is a crucial element for accumulation of
prior related knowledge, particularly about the potential target firms (Kim, 1998). In
sum, the extent of a firm’s prior related knowledge may determine the magnitude of
M&A effect on knowledge acquisition and serves as an important stepping stone for
learning how to handle cross-border M&A activities (Shimizu et al., 2004). The logic of
the above arguments and the evidence provided in existing literature suggest that the
Figure 1.
An absorptive capacity
model of acquisition of
strategic assets via M&A
lower the prior related knowledge, the less likely it is that the acquiring firm will
effectively acquire strategic assets.
Ability to integrate strategic assets and its key determinant: combinative capabilities
Mere exposure to related external knowledge is not sufficient to ensure that a firm will
internalize it successfully. Companies need to develop combinative capabilities so that
firms can synthesize and acquire new knowledge (Zollo and Singh, 2004). Common
features of combinative capabilities involve coordination capabilities and socialization
mechanisms, each provides specific ways of dealing with different dimensions of
absorptive capacity (van den Bosch et al., 1999). Coordination capabilities deepen
knowledge flows across disciplinary boundaries and lines of authority and facilitate
knowledge exchange by bringing together different sources of expertise and increasing
interaction between areas of functional, or component, knowledge (Jansen et al., 2005).
Coordination capabilities also enable employees to combine sets of existing and newly
acquired knowledge and provide an effective way of generating commitment and
facilitating the implementation of decisions (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Socialization
mechanisms, on the other hand, may influence absorptive capacity by creating broad,
tacitly understood rules for appropriate action under unspecified contingencies and
contribute to common codes of communication and dominant values (Zollo and Singh,
2004). The rationale underlying the above studies is that absorptive capacity in terms
of combinative capabilities combines resources in new ways and serves as an effective
governance mechanism, and if acquiring firms lack such capabilities, it is hard for
them to assimilate and integrate the sought-after strategic assets.
Ability to apply strategic assets and its key determinant: strategy execution and effort
Acquisition of strategic assets does not automatically result in competitive advantage
or high performance because ‘‘applying external knowledge involves the ability to
diffuse knowledge within the organization, to integrate it with the organization’s
activities and to generate new knowledge from it’’ (Lane et al., 2001, p. 1157). Previous
literature has shown that an acquiring firm’s post-acquisition strategies or what the
firm does after the acquiring activity distinguish failure from success (Hitt et al., 2001).
Therefore, effectiveness of strategy execution by an acquiring firm is an essential
factor that may influence levels of absorptive capacity and determines whether the
acquiring firm is in a position to exploit the potential of acquired new external
knowledge or not. That is, knowledge obtained matters, the acquiring firm’s strategy
execution appropriate for its competing market matters more (Hitt et al., 2001).
Accordingly, a central concern for emerging market firms is how to manage acquired
knowledge and enhance business performance. Ineffective strategy execution is one
of the primary reasons that acquisitions fail to create value for acquiring firm
shareholders (Seth et al., 2002). The problem is exemplified in the Daimler Benz
acquisition of Chrysler, where the significant opportunity to achieve economies of
scope has not been realized because of highly ineffective strategic execution. In short,
increased absorptive capacity would provide a basis for more effective management
(Narasimhan et al., 2006). With subsequent increases in absorptive capacity there
would likely be fewer errors, development of specialized and standardized routines,
and increased execution effectiveness (Nadolska and Barkema, 2007). Therefore, the
third theoretical argument in this study is the lower the level of acquiring firms’
absorptive capacity in terms of strategy execution, the less likely they can apply the
acquired strategic assets into successfully commercial use.
Absorptive capacity approach and cross-border M&A from Chinese multinational
companies (MNCs)
Among a number of significant M&A deals from Chinese MNCs, the 2004 merger of TCL
with the TV division of France’s Thomson is one of the most high-profile cases. As one
prominent Chinese company championed by the Chinese government, TCL is at the
forefront of a new wave of Chinese MNCs which are globalizing their businesses (Deng,
2009; Morck et al., 2008). TCL explicitly declares that its overseas M&A activities serve
its goal of becoming the first-class multinational in the world. In the words of TCL’s chief
financial officer, the company aims ‘‘to be the next Sony or the next Samsung’’ (Deng,
2007). To achieve such an ambitious goal, TCL lacks globally valued brands, leading-
edge technologies or genuinely innovative and admired business methods.
However, after acquiring Thomson’s TV business in 2004, TCL suffered huge losses
(with a cumulative loss of over RMB 6 billion or $680 million as of 2006) and sought
bankruptcy protection of its European operations in May 2007. As the absorptive
capacity construct explains why there are significant variations among firms in their
ability to evaluate and utilize outside knowledge (Lane et al., 2006), this framework may
provide new insights into TCL’s M&A failure. In the following, based on both primary
and secondary data and information, we illustrate the theoretical approach bymaking an
empirical study of this high-profile Chinese cross-border M&A deal in order to obtain
insights into howTCL’s lack of absorptive capacity damages its performance outcome.
TCL’s M&A of TV business of Thomson: an acquisition failure
To shed light on the explanatory power of the absorptive capacity perspective, we
collected two sources of data. The primary data were collected by interviews at TCL’s
headquarters during October and November 2007. Informed by the literature review,
before the interviews, we had developed a set of open-ended questions focusing on their
investment motivations and performances. Totally, approximately three-hour interviews
were made with five senior managers who were directly involved in the acquisition.
Participants were provided with anonymity and were requested to answer the M&A
questions with respect to a specific acquisition that he or she was most familiar with.
In addition, the interviews were supplemented with other sources of data, including
observations, company documentation, intranet and internet data, and archival data. To
increase the reliability and accuracy of our explanations, we consistently cross-checked
information and data from different sources for triangulation purposes
As China’s largest color TV and second largest mobile phone maker, TCL began to
aggressively promote its brand internationally in 2000 (Deng, 2009). Its global expansion
culminated in January 2004 when it struck a $560 million deal of merging its TV and
DVD operations with those of French consumer electronics giant Thomson. The resulting
venture, TCL-Thomson Electronics Co Ltd (TTE), in which TCL held a 67 percent of
equity share, was put into formal operation in July 2004 and was totally acquired by TCL
in 2006. When the TCL-Thomson deal was announced, it was praised as ‘‘the latest and
most dramatic example of China’s determination to put its own stamp on the global
marketplace . . . there’s no company that has a better chance of becoming China’s first
truly global corporation than TCL’’ (Business China, 2004). As another indicator of the
significance, the signing of the agreement took place in the presence of the French prime
minister and the Chinese president. Unfortunately, the deal is now widely regarded as
a typical example of Chinese company that ‘‘failed miserably in overseas expansion’’
(Economist.com, 2007). Due to its highly problematic and value-destroying European
operations, during the two years of 2005-2006, TCL cumulatively suffered a total loss of
RMB 5.07 billion ($680 million). As a result, its stock was put on a ‘‘star’’ and became ‘‘*ST
TCL’’, indicating that TCL’s stocks are at the risk of being delisted. In November 2007,
TCL declared its European operation ‘‘insolvent’’ and overhauled its TV manufacturing
operations. The primary goal for TCL to acquire Thomson’s TV unit was to obtain its
technology, distribution channel, brand and network. With the massive restructuring,
TCL has given up Thomson’s original business model, distribution channel and even the
Thomson brand. An absorptive capacity is one of the major constraints for acquiring
firms to obtain new external knowledge and has a direct impact upon business
performance (Lei and Hitt, 1995; Narasimhan et al., 2006), the framework may provide us
insights into why and how this importantM&A failed.
Lack of related knowledge of the target firm
TCL had prior related knowledge about the global TV industry and served other
emerging markets that have characteristics similar to the home market before moving
into developed markets. In Asia, for example, TCL products are sold under its own
brand, claiming a 14 percent share in Vietnam and 8 percent in the Philippines.
However, TCL failed to recognize the true value of the acquired firm because it had
not carefully examined Thomson brands and its related products and services. Hu
Qiusheng, a former TCL senior director, was thoroughly involved in the entire
negotiation process. He was firmly against the deal because of numerous ambiguities
and unfavorable terms, including paying license fees by using Thomson’s trademark in
Europe after 2008. Consequently, he was not appointed as the first CEO of TTE when it
was set up in July 2004. Moreover, during the whole negotiation process, TCL did not
hire acquisition experts as its business and financial advisors. TCL did spend 10
million and hired Boston Consulting Group (BCG) to do the appraisal. Based on the
BCG’s appraisal report, the deal was not quite optimistic due to too much risk involved.
However, TCL’s chairman, Li Dongsheng ignored the so-called ‘‘pessimistic’’ report
and decided to gamble the deal simply because the deal appeared attractive; it was
considered as a marriage between TCL’s cost advantage and Thomson’s strengths in
brands, distribution and research network in Europe and the US.
In addition, TCL’s top management team merged Thomson’s TV business without an
appropriate financial and competitive justification. As said by one former TCL executive,
‘‘Our internal review did not articulate a rationale that fits the story line of the entire
organization and also did not spell out the economic requirements for integration’’ (TCL,
personal communication, October 2007). Thomson brand in Europe and its RCA brand in
America are rather tired and dormant names. Thomson’s TV and DVD operations lost
more than $100 million in 2003. In addition, the deal was highly complex because the
joint venture had to negotiate specific contracts for access to those parts of the business
not being transferred to it, for example, the sales and intellectual property businesses
from Thomson. To make matters worse, in late 2004, Thomson surprised the market by
announcing that it was taking a small stake in Konka, a TCL rival. As one TCL executive
admitted, ‘‘The international setback is mainly because we did not prepare well before
the deal.We also are not familiar with the local business operations in Europe.We simply
think about the overseas market in our Chinese logic. When we copy Chinese business
model abroad, it does not work’’ (TCL, personal communication, October 2007).
Weak combinative capabilities
TCL not only lacked prior related knowledge about Thomson’s business operations,
but also lacked combinative capabilities to integrate and assimilate the acquired
knowledge. The shortage of TCL managers with international experience and
expertise in global marketing constitutes a major constraint. The new company did not
work well with people from different cultures, with different experiences and different
routines. Also, because of language issues and disagreements on compensation issues,
it took a long period of time for the new company to develop a common production
strategy. In the words of one TCL senior manager, ‘‘We fail to grasp and address the
barriers that may hinder the level of integration we desire. In addition, we cannot
understand and address organizational barriers that may obstruct the capture of cross-
border value or risk destroying the sources of local and international value associated
with the acquisitions’’ (TCL, personal communication, October 2007).
In addition, TCL wanted greater management and hierarchical cultural control of its
European operations. Unfortunately, it imposed control structures that were suitable
for China but not for France so that many French staff had to quit in frustration. For
example, TCL executives were unhappy to find that when they planned a weekend
meeting in France, which occurs regularly in China, TCL’s French staff had turned off
their cell phones. TCL managers also failed to understand changes in the industry
initially because they repetitively tried to assimilate new external knowledge through
their old cognitive models. Only after a series of failed assimilation processes did they
change their domestically oriented cognitive structures. It is not in doubt that differences
in cognitive structures, value systems and behavioral norms all contribute to the fact
that the new company is less likely to acquire and assimilate capabilities. As one
TCL executive commented, ‘‘Obviously, TCL was not aware of the cross-border
opportunities and managers ignored the chance to collaborate with colleagues in the
other parts of the new joint venture. Surprisingly, few people at the new company had
the knowledge or perspective needed to consider truly cross-unit, cross-functional and
cross-cultural approach’’ (TCL, personal communication, October 2007).
Problematic strategy execution
When the deal was done, TCL executives believed that the synergy of the M&A
will benefit the company in the long term, through economies of scale, complementary
resources, cost control and shared R&D capacities. But, the challenges and difficulties
were much more serious. In essence, the deal went far beyond typical arrangements
that shift a Western company’s high-cost manufacturing operations to lower-cost China.
Because of too many overlapped product lines and manufacturing facilities, it was not
very useful for TCL to shift production easily to less expensive facilities in China and to
realize greater economies of scale. In India, for instance, TTE products appear under
both Thomson and TCL brands. It also is hard to save money by using common designs
for chipsets and leveraging their clout as a bigger customer to get lower parts prices.
On the other hand, the sources of TCL’s competitive edge in China – its relationship, local
knowledge, distribution networks – could not be transferred overseas.
Moreover, TCL’s international expansion strategy was too rapid and too aggressive
so that the company failed to develop its own absorptive capacity and did not have
enough time to integrate the new knowledge and apply it into commercial end. Besides
the Thompson deal, in September 2002, TCL acquired the German-based Schneider
Corp. In 2003, it acquired GoVideo, an Arizona-based US company focusing on visual
products and DVD players. In August 2004, it created another majority-owned joint
venture, TCL and Alcatel Mobile Phones Limited (‘‘TAMP’’), to engage in mobile phone
development, production, sales and services. In 2005, it set up a third majority-owned
joint venture with InFocus Corp, South Mountain Technologies Ltd to produce
rear-projection TV components. Since TCL appeared to expand to an unlimited
international expansion, it was unable to learn from its prior experiences and apply
them throughout the organization. Elements of an effective M&A should be ensuring
that every deal supports the corporate strategy (Hitt et al., 2001; Seth et al., 2002).
Unfortunately, most of TCL’s M&A deals were only generally related to its strategic
direction and the connections were neither specific nor quantifiable.
A major motivation behind TCL’s acquisition of Thomson’s TVunit was to accelerate
its development of TV technology, but Thomson’s CRT and projection TV technologies
were quickly replaced by new technologies. As one of the TCL senior managers said:
Acquisition of Thomson didn’t help because its technical expertise lays in projection TV sets.
We had expected to sell a breakthrough design by Thomson in large-screen TVs: a rear-
projection model with a 61-inch screen in our traditional market, China, but the market simply
goes for large-screen LCD TVs . . . Our top decision makers also underestimated the sheer
difficulty of getting hundreds of people to cooperate for a common goal. They do not have
clear accountability and simply take a one-size-fits-all approach to all the M&A deals (TCL,
personal communication, October 2007).
Finally, TCL not only failed to anticipate a boom in consumer demand for flat-panel TV
sets, but also was very slow to respond to the shift in consumer preference. Flat-panel
models became the majority of TV sets sold in the USA during the third quarter of 2006.
Japan and Europe reached that milestone during mid-2006. When customers have started
switching to new LCD screens and stopped buying old-fashioned CRTand projection TV
sets, TCL’s European operations faced major structural problems. In an effort to catch up,
TCL announced plans only in 2005 to buy flat panels for its new flat-panel TV sets from
LG.Philips LCD Co. Even so, it already lost a key US sales outlet when its contract expired
with Best Buy Co in 2006. As its CRTand projection TV sales slowed down sharply, TCL
not only lost its crown as the world’s largest TVmaker to Korean rivals, but also piled up
big losses on the TCL andThomson television brands amid a series of strategic missteps.
Implications and conclusions
Based on theories of absorptive capacity, firms are motivated to enhance their
competitive advantage via acquiring strategic assets within the constraint of their
absorptive capacity. Following this logic, we provide an empirical study of one prominent
cross-border M&A deal from Chinese MNC, TCL and confirm that any attempt to
explore a firm’s strategic choice such as cross-border M&A requires an understanding
and incorporation of an acquiring firm’s absorptive capacity and its determinants at
multiple dimensions. The calculus of acquiring firms’ absorptive capacity captures the
extent to which Chinese companies may utilize M&A strategy to acquire strategic assets
and achieve superior business performance. Absorptive capacity arguments may
therefore provide an insightful explanation for why acquiring firms facing similar
competitive landscape may achieve substantially different outcomes. Firms like Lenovo
with weak absorptive capacity are not able to acquire and transfer new knowledge from
the acquired firm, nor change structures and practices which are suitable to the new
markets, thereby destroying the source of their competitive advantage.
Our study also offers practical guidance for decisions makers interested in
formulating and implementing resource-driven M&A strategy. A preoccupation with
the seemingly positive contribution of strategic assets to competitive advantage alone
is not likely to realize the M&A potential. Rather, decision makers’ appropriate
evaluation of their own absorptive capacity should be the first step to take. Only then
can they judge whether, and if so how much, they can utilize cross-broder M&A deals
as their global expansion strategy. Even if a firm may internalizes transactions
through acquisition, with weak absorptive capacity, it may be unable to assimilate and
successfully apply the acquired strategic assets, as shown in TCL’s acquisition of
Thomson’s TV business. As the biggest practical challenge that most cross-border
acquisitions face is getting not only the right deal, but also having the capability to
handle the integration efforts productively, acquiring firms must invest to build their
absorptive capacity as a pillar of their overall corporate strategy before launching an
aggressive M&A agenda.
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